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ARBITRAL DECISIONS: A SOCIAL
SCIENCE ANALOG
JOHN E. DROTNING* AND BRUCE FORTADO**
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper develops the idea that arbitral decision making has an analog
in social science research.1 It asserts that the hypothesis testing procedure in
social sciences is directly analogous to the arbitral process. The research for-
mat of an economist, sociologist, or psychologist might be as follows:
1. Generate the null (H.) and alternate (H) hypotheses to be tested.
2. Collect reliable and valid data relative to the hypothesis.
3. Evaluate and analyze this data by subjecting it to statistical tests.
4. Arrive at conclusions by accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis after
statistical testing.
5. Explain and discuss findings.
A typical arbitration proceeding involves the following:
1. Formulate submission question and stipulate facts.
2. Present evidence and testimony.
3. Evaluate and interpret the evidence adduced by the advocates.
4. Arrive at conclusions by sustaining or denying the grievance after arbitral
testing of the evidence and arguments presented by the parties.
5. Explain the decision.
The similarity is apparent and a closer examination of each of the steps
leading to retention or rejection of the null (HO) hypothesis in the social sci-
ences will reveal the extent parallel steps appear in the process of reaching an
arbitral decision. It will become evident that arbitral decision making closely
resembles social science research and that both rely on the scientific method.
Arbitration is a social science variant and the effort to quantify the standard
of proof in arbitration is no different than identifying the confidence levels in
social science research. It is hoped that this interdisciplinary approach can
change the common perception of arbitration as an amorphous art to a process
* Professor and Head of Division of Industrial Relations, Weatherhead School
of Management, Case Western Reserve University.
** Ph.D. Candidate, Division of Industrial Relations, Weatherhead School of
Management, Case Western Reserve University.
1. The authors express their gratitude to Paul F. Gerhart for suggesting the
concept of the Type I and Type II error and to Char Drotning for her help in integrat-
ing the social science hypothesis method with arbitration as well as her editorial
contributions.
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which has scientific value.*
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE HYPOTHESIS: ARBITRAL SUBMISSION QUESTION
The economist, sociologist, psychologist, or industrial relations scholar
ponders cause and effect relationships to discern significant factors affecting
the variation in a dependent variable. Once the scholar has generated an inter-
esting research question, it must be phrased in a form which allows it to be
tested. Evaluation criteria are generated by constructing an appropriate theo-
retical model of the problem. Generally, research hypotheses are narrow such
as the following example: The longer the time between a petition for a union
representation election and the actual election, the greater the chance of a
union loss in the representation election. Either this statement is true, or it is
not true, and it is the function of the research to test this hypothesis and to
accept it or reject it at some level of confidence.
The submission question in arbitration is the counterpart of the hypothe-
sis statement. A typical contract interpretation question in arbitration might
read as follows: Did the employer violate Article X of the collective bargaining
agreement by not appointing the grievant to the vacant position? Another sub-
mission might be: Did the employer have just cause to discharge the grievant?
The answers to these questions are either yes or no and the arbitrator's task is
to arrive at his conclusion with confidence that it is the most logical outcome
of his treatment of the evidence and arguments presented by the parties.
The submission question defines the limit of arbitral authority and states
exactly what the arbitration is supposed to answer, just as the social scientist's
hypothesis gives specific focus for research. The framed issue sets the stage for
the oral and written testimony. If the parties are unable to agree on the ques-
tion, or if they propose broad issues, a great deal of irrelevant testimony and
evidence is produced. The parties incur an added risk since the scope of the
question framed by the arbitrator is unknown. In this situation, presentations
can easily be misguided due to misconceptions over the appropriate issue. Ar-
bitrators are not omniscient and it makes little sense to give so many degrees
of freedom to the professional neutral. Given that the arbitrator must make
difficult determinations, the parties should not exacerbate the task by fashion-
ing an imprecise and broad question.
The opposing positions of the parties in an arbitration proceeding corre-
spond to the null (H.) and alternative (H1) hypotheses in a social science re-
search problem. The null and alternative hypotheses are constructed as oppo-
sites; when one is true the other is false.3 The null hypothesis traditionally
stands for the maintenance of the status quo. In contract interpretation cases,
2. See generally P. PRASOW & E. PETERS, ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ch. 10 (1970).
3. See P. NOEL & R. JESSEN, BASIC STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
(1982); W. WALLIS & H. ROBERTS, STATISTICS: A NEW APPROACH (1956).
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for example, the union must disprove the status quo with some level of confi-
dence (degree of proof) so that its alternative hypothesis is accepted by the
arbitrator. Conversely, in discharge and discipline cases, the company must
disprove the null hypothesis, that the grievant is innocent, in order for the
alternative hypothesis, namely, that there was just cause for the action, to be
accepted by the arbitrator. The party presenting its case first assumes the bur-
den of disproving their opponent's contention that the status quo should be
maintained, in other words the null hypothesis.
The following arbitration questions illustrate how the null and alternative
hypotheses and the burden of proof depend on the subject matter.
Contract Interpretation
H.: The Company's present and past practice is consistent with the con-
tract and should remain unchanged.
H,: The Company's action violates the contract and should be changed
regardless of past practice.
Discharge And Discipline
H.: The Union asserts that the grievant is innocent.
H,: The Company alleges that the grievant is guilty of serious infraction
and, therefore, termination is for just cause.
The benefit of doubt is always given to the null hypothesis. Only after it
has been shown that there is a very small probability that the null hypothesis
is true can the researcher or the arbitrator reject the null hypothesis and ac-
cept the alternative.
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA: ARBITRAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY
The social scientist generates data to test the hypothesis by defining vari-
ables and developing a research model. This model might include experiments,
secondary sources, samplings of the population, or interviews and question-
naires. The researcher decides what sources and form of data are appropriate
to study. This is often the most critical part of the researcher's job. The quali-
ty of data establishes the value of the study. If these data are inappropriate,
skewed, or biased, the finding can be questioned. Thus, the social scientist
must identify a set of data which will allow him to make valid conclusions
about his hypotheses.
In a similar fashion, the testimony and written evidence adduced in the
arbitral forum produce data for the arbitrator. It is not the arbitrator that
decides the source or the form of these data. The parties decide this in their
examination and cross examination of the witnesses and by the documents and
other evidence submitted in the hearing. The data introduced by each party is
biased in favor of the introducer. It is designed to support a position and to
1984]
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increase the probability of a win. From these diametric stances, the most im-
portant points should emerge. Although each party presents a biased view, the
processes of cross, rebuttal, and expert testimony, coupled with the scrutiny of
an experienced arbitrator, raise the data quality to a fairly high level.' By
utilizing these processes, the parties are enhancing the internal validity of the
data and decreasing the probability of arbitral error.
IV. EVALUATE AND ANALYZE THE DATA: INTERPRET EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY
The data generated by social science research is usually not as clear cut
as the result from a carefully controlled scientific experiment. The social sci-
ence researcher evaluates the data obtained to assess its reliability and valid-
ity. A particular result may be attributable to a number of extraneous factors.
The union success rate in winning representation elections is influenced by
other factors as well as the length of time between the petition and the elec-
tion. The social scientist has a box full of statistical tools to assess the quality
of his data, to put it in useable form, and to determine what, if anything, the
data show in relation to the hypothesis. After the appropriate manipulations
are complete the stage is set to evaluate the merits of the null hypothesis.
Similarly, it is not unusual for the testimony and evidence obtained in the
arbitration hearing to be messy and to contain extraneous and conflicting in-
formation. The advocates in arbitration have first crack at assessing the degree
to which the evidentiary data support the submission question. The arguments
put forth by the parties, either in the oral closing statements or in written post
hearing briefs, alter the character of the evidence by showing its relevance to
the respective positions. In briefs, the advocates give meaning to the testimony
and written evidence in the same way that the researcher's statistical manipu-
lations give meaning and significance to his data. Just as the social scientist
must test his data to accept or reject the null hypothesis, the arbitrator also
must evaluate the data and situation-the testimony, evidence and
argument-to answer the submitted question.
V. RESEARCH FINDING: ARBITRAL DECISION
The concluding step of a research project is relatively easy for a social
scientist. The researcher has been unbiased from the start and the various
statistical tests and tables provide him with a quantitatively objective basis on
which to accept or reject the null hypothesis and give him a certain degree of
confidence that the data and his analysis correctly describe the true variation
in the dependent variable.
The arbitrator's job, however, has just begun. He has had no part in the
design of the hearing or arguments and is faced with opposing positions. The
4. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 40-91 (1978).
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powerful inferential statistical decision testing techniques available to social
scientists are not useful in providing a basis for an arbitral decision or in giv-
ing the arbitrator confidence that his decision reflects the true situation. How-
ever, the arbitrator is not without information. He has a large body of infor-
mation from published cases, as well as from books, articles and monographs.
The arbitrator also has his own internal arbitral file stored in his memory.
These guidelines, along with intelligence and integrity, comprise the arbitral
tool box which is akin to the statistical tests and tables of the social science
researchers. The arbitrator can call on a wide variety of resources as he sub-
jects the arbitral data, namely testimonial evidence, written documents, and
the advocates' arguments, to generally accepted arbitral testing techniques.
Social scientists rely on common statistical tests and the appropriateness
of specific tests are obvious. There is no such consensus among arbitrators as
to which tools or testing procedures are most appropriate in a particular situa-
tion. In a general sense, the arbitral decision making process is analogous to
the statistical testing procedures used by social scientists in evaluating the null
hypothesis.
The social scientist's critical value for acceptance or rejection of the null
hypothesis will depend on how important he views the probability of errors
associated with that decision. That is, how costly he views mistakes. Two types
of errors are possible when a conclusion is drawn about an unknown state of
reality. The first type of error is to reject the null hypothesis when reality
supports it. This is called an alpha or Type I error. The second error involves
acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is not true. This is called a beta or
Type II error. These two types of errors are shown below in schematic form.
Reality (unknown)
H=0: True H=0: False
Accept
(H-- 0) Hypothesis
Correct Type II Error
(1 - alpha) (beta)
Reject Type I Error Correct
(H 0) Hypothesis (alpha) (1 - beta)
The researcher can use statistical means to balance Type I and Type II
errors. A common practice is to designate as the null hypothesis (H0) that
hypothesis for which rejecting when it is true, is the more serious error, so that
the Type I error would be worse than the Type II error.5 The social scientist
has formulas and tables to which he can turn once he has determined accept-
able risk levels.
An arbitrator has no statistical tables, but a similar process of balancing
5. L. LAPIN, STATISTICS FOR MODERN BUSINESS DECISIONS, 287 (1978).
19841
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risks takes place. This can be illustrated by a discharge case in which the null
hypothesis is that the grievant is innocent and the discharge unjust. An arbi-
trator's goal is to make decisions that agree with reality, that is, to be in the
two correct boxes in the above contingency table. Since reality is unknown to
him and he is presented with two opposing positions, there is a possibility that
the arbitrator's decision will be incorrect.
The dual risks involved in discharges are the probability an arbitrator will
make a Type I error of discharging an innocent grievant or a Type II error of
reinstating a guilty grievant. This is shown below:
H=0: Grievant is Innocent
Reality (Unknown to Arbitrator)
Arbitral H--0: True H---0: False
Decision Grievant Innocent Grievant Guilty
Accept Null Correct Reinstate - Type II
(Reinstate) Error
(beta)
Reject Null Fire unjustly Correct
(Sustain Type I Error
Discharge) (alpha)
The arbitral process, because of the lack of statistical techniques, utilizes
the concept of standards of proof. In discharge cases unions insist that man-
agement be the moving party and prove its allegation that the employee was
justly discharged with a standard of proof designated as "beyond a reasonable
doubt."' This standard shifts the balance or fulcrum from what it would be if
the required standard were a preponderance of evidence. The preponderance
of the evidence standard is equivalent to a statistical probability greater than
.5 that the null hypothesis is false. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
requires management to show a much higher probability that the null hypoth-
esis is false. By requiring a standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" the arbi-
trator is saying that management must show that the grievant was guilty of
the charge at a very convincing level. In effect, the arbitrator has to be com-
fortable that the facts and arguments of management allow him to reject the
null hypothesis, namely, that the grievant is innocent. Requiring this higher
standard of proof reduces the probability that the arbitrator will commit a
Type I or alpha error by sustaining the discharge of an innocent grievant.
Management prefers a preponderance of the evidence standard which would
reduce the probability of a Type II (beta) error, reinstating a quilty grievant.
Both Type I and Type II errors are important, but many arbitrators pre-
fer to reduce the likelihood of committing a Type I error by not sustaining the
6. G. LILLY, supra note 4, at 70.
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discharge of an innocent grievant. Thus, the possibility of a Type II error in-
creases and guilty grievants are reinstated more often than innocent persons
are discharged." If lower standards of proof are accepted by the arbitrator the
likelihood of making a Type I error by firing an innocent grievant increases,
and the chances of a Type II error by reinstating a guilty grievant decreases.
Controversy over standards of proof directly parallels a debate over the trade-
offs involved in changing alpha (Type I) and beta (Type II) levels.
Given the preference of many arbitrators to avoid the commission of Type
I errors, the employer must provide extremely weighty testimony and written
evidence to reduce this probability below the neutral's tolerance level. This is
akin to management proving that the disciplinary offense was committed by
the grievant beyond a reasonable doubt. This shows that the probability that
the null hypothesis is true is about .10 and allows the arbitrator to reject the
null and accept the alternate hypothesis and sustain the discharge. The disa-
greement among arbitrators over the critical cut off level for determining guilt
is congruent with social scientists using different levels of significance such as
.10, .05, and .01. The acceptable balance of risk between firing innocent griev-
ants and reinstating guilty employees depends on the values of the individual
arbitrator. This does not mean arbitration is unscientific, because the same
sort of conflict appears over acceptable levels of significance in the social
sciences.
The other question is how to decrease the probability of both errors simul-
taneously, as contrasted to the alpha-beta tradeoff. The only way to decrease
the probability of both errors simultaneously is to increase sample size, which
is often accomplished by introducing past practice and prior arbitral decisions
in similar discharge cases. An arbitrator finds it very risky to make a decision
if points are unclear in testimony, or when pertinent information has been
omitted, intentionally or accidentally, in the advocates' presentation. Although
there is controversy over when arbitrators should probe with their own ques-
tions, this can be viewed as an effort to increase the database and reduce both
types of error simultaneously.
VI. EVALUATING THE PROCESS
Social science research is evaluated in terms of validity which is defined
as how good an answer the study yields.' Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell
have broken validity into four components.9 Internal and external validity are
two of the four aspects of validity that must be considered if one is to have
7. See Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555 (1964) (Daugh-
erty, Arb.).
8. J. SIMON, BASIC RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 21 (1978).
9. Cook & Campbell, Four Kinds of Validity, in RESEARCH IN ORGANIZA-
TIONS: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 77-101 (R. Mowday & R. Steers ed. 1979).
19841
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confidence in cause-effect outcomes.10
The arbitration process, although much less rigorous raises a number of
validity issues. After receiving a list of possible neutrals, many parties research
past decisions in hopes of improving the reliability of awards. The parties incli-
nation to use a small set of arbitrators reflects their concern over random vari-
ance in decisions. The critical importance of temporal antecedence has been
vividly emphasized by Arbitrator Carroll Daugherty in determining just cause
for discharge:
The company's investigation must normally be made before its discipli-
nary decision is made. If the company fails to do so, its failure may not nor-
mally be excused on the ground that the employee will get his day in court
through the grievance procedure after the exaction of discipline. By that time
there has usually been too much hardening of position.1
Delay in processing grievances can make it difficult "to verify disputed facts,
or acquire additional facts.""2 Key witnesses may no longer be with the firm,
and memories weaken over time, which directly influences the validity of the
arbitration. Separating witnesses can be viewed as an effort to avoid subject
interaction and improve validity. These examples reflect concerns over the in-
ternal validity of an arbitration.
Consideration of mitigating circumstances in discipline and discharge
cases can be viewed as an arbitrator's consideration of confounding variables.
The importance of mitigating circumstances should not be underestimated, be-
cause they can be the turning point in cases close to the critical level for evalu-
ating the null hypothesis of no change.' 8 The proposition that an employee is
unsatisfactory due to a momentary outburst of insubordination would be
weakened if he had a clean record. The strength of the relationship between
variables is cast into doubt, so regardless of the clarity demonstrated, the im-
portance of the event is diminished. Moreover, mitigating circumstances affect
the remedy as well as the decision.
Varying company and industry standards are critical third variables that
must be considered. The level of proof required for guilt could be the same in
two diverse discharge cases, yet the remedy different. For example, Company
A, a bus line, always discharges any employee for drinking alcoholic beverages
in uniform or arriving at work intoxicated. Company B, a brewery, rarely fires
10. Id. at 79. The authors note the following: The good experiment: (1) makes
temporal antecedence clear; (2) is sensitive and powerful enough to determine that a
potential cause and effect could have covaried; (3) rules out all third variables which
might alternatively explain the relationship between cause and effect; and (4) elimi-
nates alternative hypotheses about the constructs in the relationship.
11. Grief Bros., supra note 7 at 558.
12. McKersie & Shropshire, Avoiding Written Grievances: A Successful Pro-
gram, 35 J. Bus. UNIV. CHI. 135, 137 (1962).
13. M. Stone, Why Arbitrators Reinstate Discharged Employees, MONTHLY
LAB. REv. Oct. 1969, at 10, 47.
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and usually only sends a worker home for excessively drinking before work.
The social norm in the second case is quite different since it may be common
for brewery workers to have a couple of beers before work. Therefore, it may
be understandable if a careless worker had a few too many on rare occasions.
The bus line, however, could be severely damaged if a reputation of drivers'
drinking ever appeared. This example shows arbitrators, like social scientists,
consider third variables that explain the cause and effect relationship they
have found.
When cases are cited by an advocate, the arbitrator must make a judg-
ment on external validity. Do the specifics of a case restrict its applicability?
What principles are appropriate to draw from this outside source? Past prac-
tice and the relevance of an industry standard are issues which clearly affect
arbitral decisions.
The categories of validity developed in social science can be meaningfully
applied to arbitration. This comparison can be taken beyond mere clarification
of issues. There are tradeoffs involved between some aspects of validity. Social
scientists recognize that experiments held in carefully controlled settings are
bound to be more difficult to generalize to other situations."' Arbitrators must
similarly balance the importance of the very special circumstances of a case in
light of the general consistency of principles necessary for the parties to inter-
act daily.
VII. EXPLAINING THE OUTCOMES
It is important for the social scientist to explain the significance of his
findings. He must give substance to his results by showing how they fit into
and add to current knowledge. It is essential to indicate what his findings
mean in terms of public policy. At this point the researcher's insight, back-
ground, education, experience, and biases come into play. If the social scientist
does not discuss the significance of his findings the research is only a statistical
exercise.
The arbitrator's decision should be succinct and clear so its impact is self
evident. While the arbitrator does not explain the consequences of his decision,
he must elaborate on the "testing procedures" he used to reach that decision.
For example, if the arbitrator makes the assumption that the issue to be de-
cided in a discharge case is not whether there is just cause for termination, but
whether there was sufficient cause for the employer to break the employment
relationship he must explain that assumption." Arbitration awards not only
explain what tests were used to analyze the testimony and evidence, but also
discern other relevant factors used in determining the answer. 6
14. Cook, supra note 9, at 98-100.
15. A. Ross, Comments on Kadish, in B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 789 (1977).
16. R. Mittenthal, Credibility-A Will-O'-The Wisp, in TRUTH, LIE DETEC-
TORS, AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN LABOR ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
19841
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There are a number of common tests. Did the arbitrator consider the
credibility of the witnesses if their veracity was attacked? If so, how well did
he evaluate this question of credibility? Was it based on his observations of
the witnesses behavior or inconsistent responses to direct, cross, or both? Did
the arbitrator weigh past practice and show how it affected his decision? Did
he incorporate arbitral precedent and judicial opinions if appropriate? Did he
indicate the standard of proof used in answering the question? The most im-
portant consideration is whether the arbitrator used the evidentiary data in
conjunction with the post-hearing arguments logically? Did he write his an-
swer in a clear and lucid manner so that the losing party can understand why
and how he arrived at his conclusion?
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes arbitration in terms of social science hypothesis test-
ing. It shows that the parties and the arbitrators ought to view arbitral deci-
sion as an analog to social science methodology because to do so can produce
better questions and more pertinent written evidence-in short, a better evi-
dentiary base than often occurs in practice. This analogy, in turn, will lead to
a greater chance that arbitral decisions reflect reality.
The arbitrator needs good data if he is to use his toolbox productively and
efficiently. The arbitrator wants to maximize the likelihood that he evaluates
reality correctly; he tries to make his decision fall in the correct cells in each
and every case. The evidentiary data do not always allow correct decisions, but
that does not negate the arbitrator's goal.
This is a lofty ideal and one that is not easily attained. It might be easier
if arbitrations could be quantified, but that is not possible. While there may be
many factors common to discharge cases, the uniqueness of each case must be
thoroughly considered by the arbitrator. Even though it is difficult to quantify
arbitration, it can be described in scientific fashion. A good, well-reasoned and
carefully written argument in a party's brief can be as clear and concise as the
steps in the solution of a problem in plane geometry. By the same token, the
parties have a right to expect the arbitrator to reach his conclusion in the
same manner. His answer must flow from his treatment and analysis of the
evidentiary data. It should be well-reasoned and conform in a qualitative sense
to the procedures used in hypothesis testing.
The existence of this analog between social science hypothesis testing and
arbitration can, we believe, enhance the quality of the evidentiary aspects of
arbitration as well as the concomitant arbitral decisions.
FIRST ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATION (BNA) 61-74 (1979).
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